In the summer of 1783, a trial took place in the French city of Arras. One M. de Vissery, a resident of the nearby village of St. Omer, was appealing a decision by his local aldermen, who required him to remove a lightning rod he had put on his chimney. His young defense lawyer was Maximilien Robespierre, who made a name for himself by winning the case. In preparation, Robespierre and his senior colleague corresponded with natural philosophers and jurisconsultants. Robespierre then persuasively resolved the crucial problem, namely, the proper relations of scientific to legal authority. He exploited the empiricist dogma common to contemporary physics and jurisprudence to argue that judges need not defer to scientific experts, but must only consider the facts, which required no expertise. It was a first approximation of an argument Robespierre would make with mounting authority over the next decade.
The Lawyer and the Lightning Rod
The Argument
In the summer of 1783, a trial took place in the French city of Arras. One M. de Vissery, a resident of the nearby village of St. Omer, was appealing a decision by his local aldermen, who required him to remove a lightning rod he had put on his chimney. His young defense lawyer was Maximilien Robespierre, who made a name for himself by winning the case. In preparation, Robespierre and his senior colleague corresponded with natural philosophers and jurisconsultants. Robespierre then persuasively resolved the crucial problem, namely, the proper relations of scientific to legal authority. He exploited the empiricist dogma common to contemporary physics and jurisprudence to argue that judges need not defer to scientific experts, but must only consider the facts, which required no expertise. It was a first approximation of an argument Robespierre would make with mounting authority over the next decade.
He seized the lightning from heaven and the scepter from tyrants.
-A. R. J. Turgot's epigram of Benjamin Franklin
In the old French province of Artois,' sandwiched between Flanders and the Strait of Dover, within the little town of St. Omer, halfway from Calais to Lille, there lived an elderly lawyer and amateur physicien2 named Charles Dominique de Vissery de Bois-ValC. One day in May of 1780, thrusting skyward from the tallest chimney of Vissery's house in the rue MarchC-aux-herbes, the gilt blade of a sword appeared. At the blade's base was a weathervane, done in a useful and appropriate image: a globe, lightning-struck, spewing forth burning rays. The blade and weathervane were screwed into a sixteen foot iron bar that stood in a funnel of tin.
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The funnel had a very long tail, a fifty-seven foot tin tube, which snaked over the roof and down the wall of the neighboring house. At two or three feet from the ground, it turned and made for a nearby well, whose curb it pierced before terminatingin an iron rod. The rod ended in aring; from the ring hung a chain; the chain plunged at last into water.3
The sword and darting rays of the weathervane prettily accomplished a directive from Barbier de Tinan's translation of the abbC Toaldo's memoir on the design of lightning rods (Barbier de Tinan i779),4 Vissery's inspiration and guide. They were pointy protrusions, whose utility for attracting and dispelling electrical fire was well established.5 One or another of these points would, in principle, capture a thunderbolt whatever its path of approach. Such points, atop a metallic continuity stretching from ridge of house to wet earth, made a lightning rod.
Vissery was, he said, "animated by an enthusiasm for the public good." Several of his inventions, dedicated to that end, he reckoned "worthy of being presented even to the King": an unspecified device to preserve royal troops in battle; a second, related mechanism, especially for troops "exposed to the perils of Water"; a method to preserve water from taint for a year or more; and adevice that allowed a diver to breathe, at the greatest depths, "a fresh and fortifying air."6 He claimed also to have introduced the electrical generator and the airpump to the "good patriots" of St. Orner.7 His purpose in establishing the conductor on his roof was, as always, to "serve humanity and the State."* The affair of the lightning rod of M. de Vissery de Bois-Val& did influence the fortunes of the French State, and even arguably of humanity. It began, however, as the most local of disputes, between Vissery and the neighbor down whose wall he trailed his lightning rod's tail. It became a three-year court battle, arriving finally, during the summer of 1783, at the provincial court of last appeal, the Conseil provincial et suptrieur d'Artois,g located in the provincial capital, the city of Arras. By then Vissery's case had become a political lightning rod, the talk not only of Arras but of Paris. Its culmination launched the career of an unknown member suited to climate and terrain. Rigorous observations of the effects of heat and cold on a sheep's tongue supported Montesquieu's argument that the vigorous and courageous inhabitants of the chilly North needed different laws than the lazy, timid and vengeful inhabitants of the sultry South (Montesqiueu 1748,72,233) . 12 Robespierre beguiled his audience, in both the Conseild'Artois and the court of public opinion, by identifying a principle enthusiastically embraced by contemporary legal and natural philosophy. He exploited the empiricist dogma common to physics and jurisprudence to argue that judges need not defer to scientific experts. Theory was a matter of expertise, but fact was not. Let academicians argue their theoretical differences among themselves; these could have no bearing on the important questions to be decided in a court of law. Leave aside the theories of both physics and jurisprudence, Robespierre proposed, and the two sciences would meet in the truth: in the facts.
Thus bringing physics and jurisprudence together, Robespierre reinforced a quirk that empiricist ideals had engendered in each. Where theory might connect particular facts to general knowledge, its elimination left a notable gap. When lawyers andphysiciens rejected mediating influences between local experience and universal truth as pernicious, they produced arguments with a curious lacuna between the narration of facts and the derivation of morals. The personal stories told in legal briefs of the 1770s and '80s "seemed to have little relevance to the 'big issues' faced by the French nation," but they were routinely attached to "broader public implications" (Maza 1993, 14,lO) . A similar gulf between the particular and the general lay at the crux of a political philosophy that was then rapidly growing in popularity, that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. At the start of the Revolution, Robespierre would publicly dedicate himself to Rousseauism,~3 and elements of Rousseau's theory are already implicitly present in Robespierre's plea for Vissery. Rousseau had repudiated expertise.14 He had also rejected political representation, on the ground that no individual or class of individuals could lay claim to the general will. The alienation of sovereignty must be direct and absolute, the merging of all individual wills into the general will, with no mediating authority. 15 Robespierre exploited an empiricist epistemology to authorize such breaches between the particular and the general. The very disjunction between local fact and universal truth -the absence of any interloping theory -was what bound them together, just as, in Rousseau's theory, an individual will and the general will were united by the absence of any intermediary. Robespierre offered Rousseauian repudiations of both expertise and false political power, resting them on a new, empiricist foundation. Experts and local officials alike falsely pretended to a general knowledge they could not achieve. No interpretive theory could reach from fact to universal truth, from individual experience to the general will. Judges, like physiciens, must therefore cling humbly to the facts. To be sure, as will be central to the story of the trial, Robespierre made this argument by invoking a most specialized variety of "fact."
In its first days, the lightning rod affair was about concrete particulars: a rod, a funnel, a wall, a gable, a well, three houses in the rue MarchC-aux-herbes in St. Omer. In a flash, it became instead a trial about Enlightenment and superstition, the right to property and the abuse of power. Ironically, because no interloping theory was to mediate between fact and implication, the empiricist mode of legal argument was characterized by a curious detachment from what one might have taken to be the facts of the case. In his plea, Robespierre spoke much about the testimony of the senses, and very little about the lightning rod of M. de Vissery de Bois-Val&
Act I: The Sentence
Here is how, according to Vissery himself, the troubles began.16 Mme. RenardDebussy, whose wall Vissery had borrowed for the sake of humanity, was an "old quibbler"l7 with whom he had had litigious relations. She was moreover afraid of lightning, as was Mme. Cafieri, to whose gable the lightning rod was partly affixed. Mme. Renard-Debussy set about "augmenting" Mme. Cafieri's fear and fomenting it among the other neighbors, declaring "that she would leave her house whenever it thundered etc.,"until at last a "feminine counci1"decided to present a petition to the aldermen18 of St. Omer to have Vissery's "dangerous invention" removed.
This petition, "dictated by ignorance and written by the very hand of the quibbler," predicted that Vissery's "electrized and magnetized machine would attract thunder from all over thecity"to fall upon the roofs of the rue MarchC-auxherbes. (Whether the rod was itself "electrized and magnetized"in order to attract thunder, or more generally whether and how it attracted thunder, would later become a central point of scientific contention.)I9 M. Cafieri, the "small and tender husband of the fearful lady," was concerned particularly on account of the firewood in his attic. During "moments that these lady-advocates of the night know how to exploit," M. Cafieri was persuaded to carry the petition throughout the neighborhood, going as far abroad as the Dominican monastery, where he secured the signature of the Father Superior. Some, however, refused to sign. So it was that a "caba1"of "seven or eight timid and fearful persons"signed a petition to the aldermen to dismantle Vissery's monument to modern science.
When the town bailiff, Sr. Jacques Valour,2* arrived at Vissery's door with the neighbors' approved petition, Vissery tried to dissuade him with explanations of the lightning rod, to which Valour responded "that he understood not a word"and that he "was only discharging his commission." Vissery stood firm, insisting that the lightning rod merited gratitude, not opposition.21 So the bailiff brought the petition to the aldermen to pronounce an official judgment. One of these aldermen happened to be Mme. Cafieri's brother, who equaled her husband in pliability. He stirred his colleagues to hand down a sentence "worthy of the seventeenth century" in which they forced the public prosecutor** to concur. Without regard "for the cited authority of the greatestphysiciens, Academies, republics, and entire Realms that have adopted this admirable invention,"demonstrating their "hostility toward the m o d e sauant,"and in flagrant violation of the right to property, the aldermen ordered Vissery to take down his rod within twenty-four hours, in the presence of the bailiff, who would otherwise do it for him. They thereby "augmented the ferment among the people, too susceptible to the impressions of their superiors," and incited, in the "limited minds of St. Omer," a general "terror-panic."23 Vissery's tale is one of cosmopolitan science battling provincial prejudice. But the sides cannot be so clearly drawn. Consider the reasons listed in the aldermen's 19 See infra, 53, 54. 20 Bailiffs were "minor officials of the judiciary ... responsible both for maintaining order during court proceedings and for executing the decisions of the court for which they worked" (Mousnier 1979, 1:448 original sentence of June 14, 1780. They are practical rather than superstitious, and express no general hostility toward modern science, but instead a dubious attitude toward Vissery's engineering credentials.24 The aldermen demonstrated their own competent grasp of Vissery's project, to "establish over his house an electric Conductor, to attract the thunder, in the hope that this Conductor, ending in the the well of his house, the thunder will be able to descend there and drown itself." They did not contest the philosophical validity of this plan. Instead, they supposed that "le sieur de Vissery, being perhaps not a great Physicien, could also be mistaken in the dimensions of his machine." Since the rod had "cast alarm throughout the neighborhood," it was now a matter of "police and public safety," and the order to remove it must be fulfilled even in the event of appeal.25 Vissery stalled. Two days after the aldermen rendered their judgment, he appealed their decision and accompanied his appeal with a brief on the design and function of his lightning rod. This resulted in a summons to an audience with the public prosecutor on Wednesday, June 21. That audience led to a second one, on the same day, with the aldermen. The "whole city" was by now talking of the affair, and a great crowd flooded the St. Omer town hall to hear Vissery's plea and the aldermen's response.26The aldermen issued a second sentence, affirming their first one, dismissing Vissery's appeal, and fining him almost five livres.
The aldermen expanded upon their concerns. Granted that a lightning rod attracts thunder from the clouds, how can one be certain it will not deposit that thunder on buildings and on people? They correctly pointed out that "physiciens are not themselves in agreement concerning the proportions" of a properly built r0d.27 In his plea, Robespierre would cite a passage from Benjamin Franklin suggesting that a mere "wire of a quarter of an inch diameter" would be sufficient. The continuation of the passage, which Robespierre did not cite, confirms the aldermen's suspicion of reigning uncertainty: "However, as the quantity of lightning discharged in one stroke, cannot well be measured ... and as iron ... is cheap, it may be well enough to provide a larger canal ... than we imagine necessary" (see Robespierre 1783b, 89-90).2* The aldermen worried that the "disproportion between the point and the body of the machine"in Vissery's design might cause some fluid to leak out and set fire to the house. They cited examples: a building with a lightning rod in Kent had been incinerated; sparks had flown from a lightning rod in Sienna, knocking a man to the ground; and the tip of a lightning rod in Mannheim had melted.29
If metal conducts electrical fire, what about the metal crampons attaching the rod to the roof'? Might they not divert the thunder into the house? And was it wise to conduct fire down a rod placed against the chimney, which enclosed a column of air? Might the electrical fire not interact dangerously with fires made on the hearth? The aldermen wondered too whether a conducting rod might not cause volcanoes, earthquakes and waterspouts by forcing volatile electrical fluid into the ground.30Vissery himself believed that electricity was "without doubt the veritable cause of the formation of waterspouts and terrestrial thunder,"as did his barrister.31 The Italian Franklinist Giambattista Beccaria had made the same proposal (Beccaria 1753, Bk. 11; see also Heilbron 1979, 365 n. 89) .
The aldermen also introduced a statistical argument, using the contemporary theory of probabilities that considered the value as well as the likelihood of an outcome (Daston 1988,17-18,24,39) . Lightning rods, they said, were much more dangerous than the small-pox innoculation, when measured against potential gains, for "out of 100,000 persons 99,000 are attacked by smallpox, while out of 100,000 edifices only a single one is struck by lightning."3* Vissery, annoyed at the twenty-four hour deadline given him to dismantle the rod, inadvertently conceded as much. The machine, he said, could not "be taken off like a shirt," and anyway, "it has not thundered in this city all year, and thus we have no more to fear from thunder, than from the plague that reigns in Constantinople."33
In short, the aldermen gave, by contemporary standards, solid scientific arguments against Vissery's lightning rod. Their electrical queries, their empirical examples and their statistical reckoning were perfectly in keeping with the most reputable of natural science in the 1780s -and indistinguishable, in terms of their scientific respectability, from Vissery's own arguments. Vissery now began to court enlightened attention for his "disagreeable affair."39 He wrote to "several great physiciens and to several Academies," those of Arras and Dijon. Hugues Maret, doctor and perpetual secretary of the Academy of Dijon, responded, recommending that Vissery produce an official statement on the construction of his lightning rod in the presence of Valour, the bailiff. Valour never appeared, but Vissery, undeterred, proceeded in the presence of two notaries, and sent Maret the statement40 and a detailed drawing. These were examined by a committee composed of Maret and Louis Bernard Guyton de Morveau, who was a fellow-member of the Dijon Academy, a lawyer at the Parlement of Dijon, and the author of the article "Thunder" in the 1777 supplement to the EncycZopPdie (Morveau 1777) . Based on their report, the Academy sent Vissery an "ample and honorable certificate. . . proving that my lightning rod is made according to all the rules of the art."41 there were thirty-nine in the late eighteenth century, including the gouvernemenr of Artois. The highest authorities of the gouvernements were initially the gouverneurs, but their authority gradually shifted to their underlings, lieutenants and commandunts (see Marion 1923, 113, 259-60) .
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36 Buissart, draft of memoir, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/30, [8] [9] 3' "Extrait du procks-verbal des notaires, du 7 aoQt 1780" (Robespierre 1910, 1:103-104) . 3* Vissery to Buissart, 25 October, 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/8. 39 Vissery to Buissart, 7 September 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/ 1. Vissery was accustomed to rallying important people to his personal causes. Early in his correspondence with Buissart, he wrote, "I need a powerful protector to have access to the Throne, which 1 lack at present, my Parisian correspondent, despite his beautiful promises, no longer responds to me, not knowing whether he is dead or alive, I need to find another means: in reflecting upon this matter, it seems to me that the R.P. Cotte, having the good fortune and advantage of often speaking to the King, could mention to him something of my inventions to prick his curiosity." Buissart transmitted the message, to which the pkre Cotte replied to please tell Vissery "I myself do not present my own observations to the King, 1 have never had the honor of speaking to the King nor even of seeing him."Vissery to Buissart, 7 July 1780, Cotte to Buissart, 15 August 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/2,4J/ 118/34.
40 "Procbs-verbal des notaires, du 7 aoDt 1780" (Buissart 1782, 60-61 In their report, Morveau and Maret noted the irregularity of partly substituting a tin tube for an iron rod. They emphasized however that any metal of a"considerable enough volume" would work, and cited a case of a lightning stroke in Dijon, which Morveau had reported in "Thunder" (Morveau 1777,9) , to demonstrate the excellent conductivity of tin: lightning had struck a house and been conducted along its tin gutters, only "exploding" at their two ends. The lightning stroke had divided into two currents, and each had caused "a great hole" at the end of the gutter, damaging the wall on either side "over a very large area." This example, though intended to show the safety of Vissery's conductor, confirmed two of the aldermen's suspicions: that a lightning stroke could divide into separate currents; and that these could follow other metals in a house's construction. Morveau and Maret also invoked one of the aldermen's own examples to opposite effect: in the Sienna lightning stroke of April 1777, they pointed out, the cathedral itself had suffered no damage.42
Vissery's appeal to the Academy of Arras, meanwhile, brought his plight to the attention of another barristerlphysicien, Buissart. A member of the Arras and Dijon Academies and the Paris Society of Medicine, and a regular contributor to the Journal de Physique, Buissart was accorded the dubious honor of being the "greatestphysicien of the Arras bar"(Wa1ter 1961, 1:33-5). Like Vissery, Buissart was an inventor. He had devised a "hygrometer"for measuring water-vapor in the atmosphere, an instrument admired enough that its authorship was fiercely and lengthily contested (ibid, 3 5 ) . 4 3 Buissart had also developed anew use of lightning rods, to protect the fields from hail, on the theory that hail was caused by electricity in the clouds, which could be continuously discharged by the action of many rods at once.44
During the summer of 1780, Buissart followed Vissery's case with interest. In September, the case had gained enough prominence to be written up in the Mercure de France,45 and Vissery appealed to Buissart for help. Maret had advised Vissery that he had acase against the signers of the petition. "My design,"Vissery wrote to Buissart, "is not to dwell much on the utility of lightning rods ... but to revolt against vronder] the too-rigorous judgement of the judges." Vissery proposed to argue on procedural, not scientific grounds, that the aldermen had violated their duty to consult scientific experts before making their decision:
"when prudent judges wish not to compromise themselves ... in matters they are not obliged to fathom they refer to so-called Experts -as is done in surgery, 42 "Extrait des registres de I'Academiede Dijon du I8 aoht 1780" (Robespierre 1910 44 Maret, told of this idea, responded that it had already been proposed, but that the public was "not yet advanced enough"for its execution. Maret to Buissart, 6 February 1781, AGPC, Coil. Bar., 4J/ 120/ 11. Bertholon worried that "nasty jokers" would make "ill-placed jeers" at the prodigious number of rods in Buissart's plan. Bertholon to Buissart, 2 May 1781, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 119/3. 45 The Mercure de France write-up is mentioned in Cotte to Buissart, 15 justice?"Similarly, if a"machine or apparatus had the virtue of curing or dissipating the plague ... would one need the permission of the police to erect it on one's house?" Here was no justice, but "barbaric despotism."48 Because it had acted wrongly in failing to consult experts, the public ministry should bear the costs of Vissery's appeal. His lightning rod had not caused a "terror-panic"; the rash and inexpert judgment of the aldermen had been the cause. Buissart, 7 September 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/ 1. Vissery believed this last point to be the salient one, and would later insist that Buissart emphasize it. At Vissery's urging, Buissart wrote to Cotte that he had not previously made it sufficiently "clear" that "it was not the lightning rod that caused the uproar and alarm, but the judgement of the magistracy of St. Omer." Buissart to Cotte, 8 December 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 1 18/36. Vissery's subsidiary claims were as follows. First, the citizens of St. Omer, frightened by their aldermen, had since been calmed by a journal-article about the case written by a friend of Vissery's (perhaps the Mercure de France notice mentioned above, n. 45) and it was therefore no longer apolice matter. Second, the bailiff must serve him the neighbors'petition so that he could bring suit against his accusers. A note in Buissart's papers identifies a precedent stating that the public ministry was obliged to identify an appellant's denunciators so that the appellant could bring suit against them to recover the costs. "Journal historique le 7 fevrier 1772,"AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/ 17. However, the bailiff never served the petition to Vissery, a fact which became central to Vissery's claim against him. See Buissart, draft of memoir, AGPC, Coll. Bar, 4J/ 120/30,5,74; "Consultationdu 15 Septembre, 1782" (Robespierre 1910,1:114) . Third, Vissery must not be held responsible for the rent of the neighboring house, which had been devalued by the scandal and threatened with abandonment. Vissery to Buissart, 7 September 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/ I . Finally, the public ministry should bear the costs of his appeal, though it was not generally liable for the costs of appeals against it, because it had "lent its hand to childish and frivolous fears. the Academy; Jean Baptiste Le Roy, an academician and the leading French exponent of Benjamin Franklin's theory of electricity; and the marquis de Condorcet, perpetual secretary of the Academy. These consultants were unanimously incredulous that "fifty leagues from the capital and at the end of the eighteenth century," as Le Roy remarked,54 such a backward decision as the St. Omer aldermen's was possible. Bertholon declared it an "ignominious pretension and without any foundation to claim one cannot erect a lightning rod without police authorization."55 Cotte marveled that the aldermen seemed to possess not a "smattering of physics."56 Did they not read the journals? And even if they "read only the gazette,"they should know better than to mistrust Vissery's lightning rod? Maret, upon learning that a fellow doctor was "one of the magistrate-destroyers of the lightning rod," wrote "this gives me a very bad idea of him, and I hope he won't be long ... in being punished for his indiscretion."5* Thephilosophes'advice to Buissart was authoritarian for an enlightened crowd, Maret supplied Buissart with a list of lightning rods across Europe, approving of Buissart's intention to cite as many examples as possible, for "the common man can be but an imitator, and there are so few who think for themselves that to crush them under the weight of authority is to perform a service for them."59 The naturalist comte de Buffon counseled not to "worry on account of those who are contradictors only because they are ignorant."6* Condorcet reportedly recommended "pouring ridicule over the whole affair."61 This Bertholon did, in a performance at the Montpellier Academy of Sciences' regular public session before the Languedoc Estates General. He described the scene to Buissart:
These Estates are always brilliant, as there are 22 Bishops, as many Barons, deputies of the Clergy, those of the nobility, the Commandant of the province, and the second commandants, the intendants, etc., a great number of people of all the estates, even distinguished ladies etc., the room is always full, and one of the grenadiers ... was obliged to quit his post, because he was suffocating from the hot air.
In this overheated environment, Bertholon read a memoir on the efficacy of lightning rods. that place . , , the whole was heard with pleasure; and I will even tell you that the reading of my memoir was frequently interrupted by applause.62
Bertholon also recommended, "to succeed in your trial, you have to create a rumor that there is ascavant, and a littkrateur of Paris who proposes after thejudgement in the trial to lampoon the judges or adversaries if there are any; and that Beaumarchais will add his touch: this is worth more than all the good reasons in the world, for those who are not made to hear them."63 Bertholon himself promised a"b1oody tirade against the ignorance of the alleged magistrates of St. Omer; those of Arras will have their part, if they participate in the sovereign omerian imbecility."64
Apart from sympathetic outrage, Buissart's scientific consultants promised facts. Bertholon should have had many at his disposal, as a leading advocate and designer of lightning rods. He had recently invented a new variety, "ascending rods,'' which were meant to work in reverse, discharging strokes of lightning that went upward from the ground into the clouds.65 Like Buissart, Bertholon had also proposed some bold new applications of electrical conductors, the "paraearthquake" and the "para-volcano," on the theory that electricity was a cause of these natural disasters as we11.66 Buissart began his research by posing Bertholon four questions: in which regions of France had lightning rods been established, and when, and had the gazettes mentioned them, and what were the most striking examples of their effectiveness? But Bertholon cautioned that the "enumeration" Buissart requested "should not be made, because it will not be considerable enough to strike the ignorant. In France there are very few lightning rods." He calculated a total of eleven, all of them enprovince, which he listed to Buissart: one in Valence in the Dauphin& three in and around Dijon and one in Bourg-en-Bresse, in Burgundy; one on a country house in Anjou; Voltaire had had one at Ferney; and finally, there were four in Lyon, established by Bertholon himself the previous year.67
Nor had Cotte much to offer in the way of instances of working lightning rods. He wrote that he had a "Conductor 15 toises long that is not even arranged in a manner to preserve our Church ... as my unique object is to obtain Electricity 62 Bertholon to Buissart, 29 January 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 119j8. 63 Bertholon to Buissart, 29 December 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 1191 16. The playwright Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais had ridiculed the Parlement in a series of much-celebrated and imitated mkmoires during the Maupeou Revolution of 1771-74, a power struggle between the Crown and the Parlement in which Louis XV and his Chancellor, Rent-Nicolas-Charles-Augustin de Maupeou, exiled the recalcitrant Parlement and replaced it with a new, more pliant one. On the Maupeou Revolution, see Bell 1994,138-63; and Swann 1995, Ch. 12 during stormy weather," and so his rod was insulated, not grounded. It was arranged to connect with a grounded conductor nearby, but Cotte had seldom established this communication. He had only seen lightning strike once in Montmorency, where he lived, and "not even on my Conductor."It had fallen "in a body of Water, which has much more to fear than a conductor for attracting thunder." This thought inspired Cotte: Vissery might counter-sue Renard-Debussy to oblige him to dry out his garden pond, if he had one. "The Sentence that condemns him will be assuredly better founded than that which requires the demolition of lightning rods."@ Vissery's supporters looked expectantly toward the capital for salvation, but it proved difficult to secure official Parisian sanction for Vissery's case, perhaps because of the scarcity of experience with lightning rods. When Cotte consulted "one of the cleverest councilors of Chhtelet," the lawyer told Cotte that the aldermen had not judged wrongly. Another tribunal might grant Vissery on appeal the right to reconstruct his machine, but would never inculpate the aldermen for having taken "necessary measures to stop the tumult and clamor of the people."69 The public ministry would therefore not be responsible for the expenses of Vissery's appeal. Buissart was undeterred. Vissery had been wronged by the aldermen of St, Omer, who had violated their duty to consult experts. They should bear the costs of their error. Vissery's cause was "that of allphysiciens. That is why I propose to defend it vigorously."70 In December, Buissart wrote to Cotte, asking him to secure the approbation of the Paris Academy of Sciences for Vissery's lightning rod.71
Cotte obliged by consulting Condorcet. But Condorcet responded that since the Academy of Dijon had already pronounced on Vissery's rod, the Paris Academy of Sciences would decline to re-examine it. They would wait until the Conseil d'Artois asked for their advice. Condorcet therefore offered only some recommendations about how to manuever the Court into approaching the Academy.72 Buissart reported some months later that he had taken measures to ensure, and had been "led to believe," that the Conseil d'Artois would consult the Paris Academy of Sciences before rendering a judgment in the case.'3
As for a lawyers' consultation, which Buissart had also requested, Condorcet thought it better to have a lawyer, "guided by physiciens," write a brief.74 The
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lawyer whom Vissery and Buissart charged with this task was slow and unresponsive.75 Vissery grew restive. In the spring of 178 1, after waiting six months for the Paris brief, he wrote to Buissart that "for several days frequent and frightful flashes of lightning have been followed by dreadful noises." His "adversaries" would be to blame "if thunder falls and crushes my house."
Vissery had grown tired of "the demi-savans" who teased that he may well be benefiting humanity but "they would not want to be my neighbor." Being of an "advanced age," he had begun to fear he would never see the end of the affair. "Does it not seem," he complained to Buissart, "that an evil demon is presiding over all these long delays?"76 Buissart reported Vissery's mood to Cotte. They would do without the Parisian lawyer's brief, and would return to their original idea of a consultation. This would accompany Buissart's own brief, which they would publish instead.77
Act 111: The Brief
In view of his client's growing impatience, Buissart dashed off the 86-page brief in eight days.78 He took his central line of argument from Vissery: the subordination of legal to scientific authority. There were, Buissart considered, two questions to be decided: whether lightning rods were dangerous or advantageous, and whether Vissery's lightning rod was well or badly constructed. The answer to each rested upon expert knowledge.79 By failing to consult experts on the first question, concerning lightning rods in general, the aldermen had been guilty of incorrect physics, and rendered ajudgment "irregular as to content."80 By failing to consult experts on the second question, concerning Vissery's lightning rod in particular, the aldermen had been guilty of incorrect procedure, and had rendered ajudgment "irregular as to form."gt the costs of the trial. Buissart to Cotte, 8 December 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 119/36; see also Buissart to Cotte, 19 December 1780, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 1l9/38. For the brief that Condorcet proposed, Vissery would pay only the printing costs, and the lawyer would be compensated by the sales of the brief. Trial briefs were published with increasing frequency over the course of the eighteenth century. On the importance of the memoirejudiciaire in French political culture, see Maza 1993,35-38; Bell 1994, 87-89. 75 The lawyer in question is identified in several letters as " However, the second half of the brief, ostensibly devoted to the design of Vissery's lightning rod, in fact contains no discussion of the rod's design except an assertion that it is "invulnerable to all criticism."82 Instead, Buissart here considers the death of Georg Wilhelm Richmann, who had been killed during an experiment with an insulated conductor in St. Petersburg in 1753. 83 Buissart uses this accident as a context in which to emphasize the difference between what he calls an "electrometer" and a lightning rod. An electrometer, he explains, is an insulated conducting rod used to collect electricity and thereby "to indicate the greater or lesser amount ... spread through the atmospheric air." The lightning rod, in contrast, is grounded; it "communicates with the damp earth or water," and so rather than collecting, it diffuses electricity into the ground. People "badly confuse these two instruments, which are very different."Vissery's instrument is a lightning rod, not an electrometer, and therefore entirely dissimilar to the dangerous instrument involved in Richmann's accident.84
Meanwhile, the first half of the brief, devoted to showing the efficacy of lightning rods in general, is a largely miscellaneous treatise on the science of electricity, including its history over the past century, its amusement value, and its medical applications (accelerating perspiration and the circulation of the blood).85 There is only a brief passage on the more salient analogy between electricity and lightning. Franklin had had this analogy in mind, according to Buissart, during his experiments with the Leyden jar. The commotion when he discharged the condenser had reminded him of a stroke of lightning in miniature.86 Franklin had then "rec0gnized"that "all electrized bodies have an atmosphere,"that this atmosphere "extends farther at the angles of bodies than anywhere else," and that therefore "points attract the electrical material,"and by implication, lightning, "from farther and more efficiently than all other bodies."
The argument was simple: lightning is electricity. (Though Buissart also lists as "secondary causes" of lightning "inflammable air" and phosphorus, to which he attributes the sound of t h~n d e r . )~' Points attract electricity. Ergo the lightning 82 Here Buissart cites the approval of the Dijon Academy, and the later concurrence of the pkre Cotte. Buissart 86 The analogy between lightning and electricity was common among electrical experimenters by the 1740s. Nollet, for example, proposed it several years before Franklin. See Torlais 1954, 112-13;  Nollet to Jean Jallabert, 2 June 1752 (Benguigui n.d., 216) . Thus the analogy between lightning and electricity neither relied upon, nor especially supported, Franklin's account of electrical action (see Heitbron 1979, 339-41) . As for the role of the analogy in the development of Franklin's theory, he introduced the concepts of electrical atmospheres and the power of points in a letter to Peter Collinson dated July I I , 1747, which included descriptions of his first Leydenjar experiments. In that letter, Franklin describes an electrical spark as being "like a flash of lightning" (Frank1in 1941, 177) . But he did not expand upon the analogy until 1749. See "Letter V"(l749) (Franklin 1941,201-21 I) ; "Opinions and Conjectures" (1749) (Franklin 1941, 213-36) ; and Cohen, "Franklin's Work in Electricity"(l941) (Franklin 1941 , 1 I I).
rod.88 This information, conveyed in two sentences, comprises Buissart's entire explanation of the electrical phenomenon most relevant to the design of lightning rods, the so-called "power of points." But this vagueness was not Buissart's fault.
Franklin's theory of electrical action, including the power of points to attract and dispel electrical fluid, was itself riddled with causal gaps and inconsistencies. These had inspired much opposition, both to the theory and to its leading application, the lightning r0d.89
Advocates of lightning rods called this opposition prejudice. Franklin himself, for example, saw prejudice in the refusal of his leading French opponent, the abbC Jean Antoine Nollet, to accept the lightning rod. Franklin pointed out that Nollet must believe in the conduction of lightning since he warned against the customary ringing of church bells during storms, because the bell-pull could conduct electricity down to kill the ringer. Franklin remarked, "how long even philosophers, men of extensive science and great ingenuity, can hold out against the evidence of new knowledge that does not square with their preconception^."^^ Yet Nollet's objection was philosophically consistent. He pleaded "too great a disproportion between the effect and the cause"; erecting a lightning rod was like putting a narrow tube into a rushing torrent in the hope of preventing a flood (Nollet 1754, cited in Cohen 1990, 136) . Nevertheless, the Franklinist view of doubts like Nollet's was influential. Vissery and his allies adopted it, and Robespierre popularized it. Many since have accused early opponents of lightning rods of "prejudice" and called their arguments ''pseudo-scientific."9~ Perhaps they were, but if so, they were no worse than the arguments in favor of lightning rods, whose proponents were altogether unable to explain how their devices were meant to work.
Franklin initially suggested that the rods drew electrical charge from the clouds, gradually and continually restoring equilibrium and so preventing a bolt. Then, he decided that rods could also function even if they failed to prevent a stroke, by channelling it into the ground and diffusing it. Later yet, Franklin decided that when lightning struck, the ground was usually electrified positively and the clouds negatively, thus it was the ground that struck into the sky rather than vice versa. In that case the relevant property would be the power of points, not to attract, but to dispel electrical fire, presenting yet a third way in which rods might function 88 Buissart, draft of memoir, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/30,13. After the first successful conducting rod experiment at Marly-la-Ville in May 1752, an experiment which Franklin had proposed, he and lightning rods were universally associated. But Jacques de Romas, a Nolletist electrician in Bordeaux, obtained certificates of priority for the electrical kite experiment from the Bordeaux Academy of Sciences, and also ultimately from the Paris Academy. Romas even likely conceived of a sort of lightning rod, and submitted the idea to a notable member of the Bordeaux Academy, the baron de Montesquieu, the year before the Marly experiment (see Romas 191 1,289,73,183-85; also Heilbron 1979, 351) .
B9 On the inconsistencies in, and opposition to, Franklinist electrical theory, see Heilbron 1979, 90 Franklin to Winthrop, 2 July 1768 (Franklin 1959-, 15166-72) . 91 The quotations are from recent examples : Cohen 1990, 119; Cohen 1956 , 51 1.
344-402. (Cohen 1990, 14, 119, 126-27) . Franklinist advocates of lightning rods were unable to explain how points both attracted and dispelled electrical fire, and to decide whether one or the other (or both) of these powers was instrumental in protecting civilization from lightning.92
Buissart's few, equivocal comments on the power of points reflect the reigning theoretical uncertainty. For example, having initially claimed that pointed conductors attract electric material, he later seemed to contradict this earlier statement when he wrote: "[the idea] that electric conductors attract thunder from the clouds , ,. is but a phantom easy to destroy," Conductors do not attract lightning; instead they silently discharge the clouds' surplus electricity by channelling it into the ground. But Buissart's elaboration on this statement includes another about-face: "if an explosion does occur, the blade of fire escaping from the clouds is attracted by the conductor, provided it passes within the extension of its sphere of activity."93 Buissart also mentions the theory of ascending thunder, and Bertholon's ascending rods, which were meant to work by the power of points to dispel, not attract, electrical material.
Poor Buissart! The claim that lightning rods attract lightning to houses that would not otherwise have been struck was at the heart of his opponents'case. In response, he could only cite the leading authorities on lightning rods, who offered a resounding yes, no, and maybe. But never mind -he cut his electrical explanations short with a rhetorical query: "to what end shall we devote ourselves to the reasons of Science that establish the theory of thunder and consequently of Lightning Rods? The efficacity of this machine must be shown less by solid reasons, than by conclusive facts." Hence, it "matters little if we know the nature of the electric fluid; [or] its manner of acting" (Buissart 1782,29) . Here was a new and potentially powerful tactic: the irrelevance of explanations in the face of "facts." By misrepresenting his opponents as having categorically rejected lightning rods out of an indifference to facts, Buissart was able to assume the mantle of empiricism.94 He listed every instance of a lightning rod's existence or functioning that he had been able to gather.
These "facts," however, were also equivocal. For example, Buissart excerpted 92 "Thus the pointed rod either prevents a stroke from the cloud, or, if a stroke is made, conducts it to the earth." Franklin, "Of Lightning, and the Method (now used in America) of securing Buildings and Persons from its mischievous Effects," September 1767 (Franklin 1941, 391 94 Buissart wrote that the lightning rod was "the happiest discovery made this Century, far from being dangerous in itself as the aldermen of St. Omer announce."Buissart, draft of memoir, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/30,45. In their first sentence, the aldermen had written: "this physics experiment that the sieur de Vyssery wants to do is dangerous in itself, and casts alarm throughout the neighborhood." The context suggests that "dangerous in itself'' was intended to mean, not that all lightning rods are necessarily dangerous, but that Vissery's lightning rod presented a direct danger as well as an indirect one through its effect on the residents of the city. See "Sentence des echevins de Saint-Omer, du 14 juin 1780" (Robespierre 1910, 1:lOl) . the account of the Sienna lightning-stroke -the same event that both the aldermen and the Dijon Academy had already claimed in support of their opposing positions -from the JournaI de Physique. 95 The passage in Buissart's memoir included "a purple globe of fire"that descended along the lightning rod and, before disappearing into the ground, "threw off great sparks"; a man standing in the door of his shop across the street, knocked to the ground; and large quantities of sulfurous smoke that poured through the streets afterward.96 Buissart then excerpted the account of the Mannheim lightning-stroke from the same journal.97 This too involved unsettling facts, such as the fact that -as the aldermen had mentioned -the point of the Mannheim rod was afterward observed to be damageda9* Perhaps because of the ambiguity of the facts, Buissart did not fully develop the empiricist strategy. Instead, he rested his case on the subordination of legal to scientific authority: "judges are not supposed to be Physiciens. Physics and Jurisprudence are two very different Sciences." Even judges well-informed in natural philosophy could not possibly keep up with the latest developments. They must therefore "address themselves to professionals." Buissart adopted Vissery's own architectural analogy. An overhanging chimney is said to be solid by its owner, but a neighbor claims it is in imminent danger of falling, crushing people beneath and part of his house. Would a judge "immediately have the chimney demolished? no, without doubt, but he would order by a preparatory judgement ... that it be visited by architects , , . the judge would only decide based on the report of experts and would pronounce nothing by himself. The same goes for physics as for architecture."99 However, as with the crucial scientific question of whether lightning rods attract thunder, Buissart was equivocal concerning the crucial jurisprudential question of how much physics a judge could be expected to know. A judge's function, to "maintain order and harmony in the society," required that he "have a certain knowledge of all that is useful or harmful to the public." Judges therefore had a duty to "apprehend, so to speak, each day, the discoveries that have been made in this genre. The books, journals and political papers that are disseminated with such profusion have no other purpose.""JO On the other hand, Buissart claimed thatjudges were required to consult experts by Title 21 of the Ordinance of 1667,Io1 the civil half of Jean-Baptiste Colbert's re-codification of civil and criminal procedure. In fact, Title 21 stated that "judges cannot make visits to scenes when all that is needed is a simple report of experts. It did not constrain judges' decisions, but only their travels. The intent had patently been to economize and to simplify the judge's job, not to limit his authority.103 Nevertheless, "Voihi," Buissart concluded, "the ordinary working of Justice. The Judge decides only on the basis of the Experts'report, and pronounces nothing on his own" (Buissart 1782, 68-71) .
Based upon scientific equivocation, jurisprudential ambivalence, and some dubious citations of fact and statute, Buissart concluded that the Arras judges must draw no conclusion: they must defer to the Academy of Dijon or seek the advice of the Paris Academy of Sciences.104
Act IV: Consultations and Intrigues
In July 1781, Buissart sent his brief to Cotte.105 He need not have hurried. In September, Cotte reported that it was at the Maison des Avocats, awaiting the addition of a signed consu1tation.1O6 In December, Cotte encouragingly mentioned the names of two eminent jurisconsultants: Lacretelle and Guy-Jean-Baptiste Target.107 The following April, "these Messieurs" still kept "the most profound of silences."lOa Buissart dispatched Bertholon in person to demand the memoir from Lacretelle; Lacretelle told Bertholon he had given it to Condorcet; Condorcet said he had sent it to Cotte; Cotte was out of town and, when Bertholon tracked him down, said he had already sent it back to Buissart.Io9 Finally in May, after almost a year, Lacretelle and Target signed a consultation and sent it, with the brief, to Buissart.1'0
The consultation affirmed Vissery's and Buissart's argument that judges must defer to experts in matters of science. The jurisconsultants wrote that it was "not up to the people, nor even to Judges to pronounce" on matters like Vissery's, but was the business of "Savants." The aldermen had broken simplerapportd'experts,"April1667(Isambert et al. 1822-33,18: 103,140-45) . On the passage ofthe Ordonnonce, see Andrews 1994,417-18. 103 Characterizing the principles of jurisprudence underlying the Colbert reforms, Andrews cites Daniel Jousse: "Judges should be entirely free in their judicial opinions, free from any constraints or other pressures that could prevent them from acting according to their knowledge, wisdom and convictions" (Andrews 1994,496 Buissart, 22 December 1781, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ Il8/56. Cotte mentions three other possible collaborators: "Gerbier" (Pierre-Jean-Baptiste Gerbier), "Beaumont" @lie de Beaumont) and "Le Gouvte" (Jean-Baptiste Le Gouvt). On Le GOUVC, Target, Gerbier and Beaumont as jurisconsultants, bamsters and men of letters, see Bell 1994, 121, 132- The consultation was also signed by "Polverel"(the barrister Etienne de Polverel) and "ilenry."
one of the principal rules of the judicial order. The Law forbids a judge to decide by himself all questions having to do with the Arts and Sciences. It orders him in this case to invoke the knowledge of Artists and Savants, and to judge according to their report.
The aldermen had also violated "the fundamental right to property" and had shown themselves "to oppose the progress of the Sciences."The barristers moreover agreed with Vissery and Buissart that the aldermen's failure to consult experts had provoked fear: "One could say that if the terror of the people was born of their ignorance, it grew by the imprudence of the Judgements." Indeed, more fully than Vissery and Buissart had done, the barristers developed a theory of the importance of expertise. This theory rested upon an assumed social hierarchy. The people must defer to the judges, while the judges deferred to the experts. By failing to carry out their part, the aldermen had dropped from their position in the ladder of authority and "become people themselves."The jurisconsultants'social and legal theory of expertise was about authority, not knowledge. The role of experts was not so much to inform a judgment, as to legitimate it:
Even if the Judge is well enough versed in a Science or Art, to resolve the question according to his own lights, he should nonetheless consult people of the Art, because he has a mission as a Judge, and he has none as a Savant.
However, the consultants also found that the aldermen would have been correct in responding to the popular alarm by provisionally banning Vissery's machine if only they had also sought "to reconcile the Inhabitants of their City" to the lightning rod. Like the St. Omer aldermen and the Chiitelet lawyer Cotte had earlier consulted, Lacretelle and Target emphasized the importance of quelling a panic. Vissery's affair, they wrote, affirmed the natural tendency of the people to fear novel scientific discoveries. Their terror was an escalating contagion, quickly becoming "a Fanaticism."The consultation recommended that the superior court show prudence in reestablishing Vissery's lightning rod. In order to calm the people, the court should order an examination of the machine by the Paris Academy of Sciences, The Academy would name local "physiciens" to present it with an official description, upon which it would base its decision. This decision would then be published and distributed in St. Omer before the rod was replaced.Ii1
Buissart received this consultation with mitigated gratitude. He would have liked an even stronger inculpation of the aldermen, one which would have required them to pay the costs of Vissery's appeal.112 Vissery was even less pleased. The consultation was too deferential to the "alarms and chimerical terrors'' of the people. Also, capriciously, Vissery disliked the recommendation that the superior court order that his lightning rod be examined by experts at the Paris Academy of Sciences. True, acquiring this recommendation had been his and Buissart's original purpose. But Vissery had grown too impatient to tolerate such an inspection and was, moreover, reluctant to pay for it. He could almost believe that there had been "a connivance between [his adversaries] and the Lawyers of Paris."ll3
Nevertheless the brief, with the accompanying consultation, was published at the end of 1782. Vissery had Buissart forward copies to Bertholon, Maret, Cotte and Franklin.114 These scientific consultants now began to quibble with the brief's many facts, most of which they themselves had supplied. "Do not at all cite in your memoir," admonished Bertholon, "this supposed project of elevating lightning rods on the gallery of the Louvre, because this, not being true, will hurt the cause of lightning rods."Il5 The news of the "supposed project'' had come from Le Roy, who in turn pointed out some factual lapses. In one, Buissart sarcastically berated the aldermen for claiming, in their original sentence, that the "famous Bernoulli, who died in his bed,"had been killed in the accident that had in fact claimed the life of Richmann. But Buissart then located Richmann's fatal accident in Moscow, as, later, did Robespierre.116 Both ignored Le Roy's correction, statingthat Richmann died in the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, where he lived. Le Roy, apologizing for introducing such a trivial concern, thought consistency important, since "you justly reproach the magistrates for having killed the celebrated Daniel Bernoulli."
More to the point, Le Roy emphasized that there was no lightning rod on the King's palace at La Muette, as Buissart's memoir, and Morveau's and Maret's report,li7 claimed, nor even, as Robespierre later maintained (Robespierre 1783a, 59-60),11* on the cabinel dephysique at La Muette. In the first place, the cabinet de physique was not at La Muette, but nearby at a house in Passy. Secondly, there was no lightning rod at the cabinet dephysique, but only an "electroscope" (the instrument Buissart had called an "electrorneter"),1~9 an insulated conductor that 113 Vissery demanded a second consultation with Arras lawyers, who proved more obliging, finding the aldermen personally liable for Vissery's legal bills. Vissery to Buissart, 10 June 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 451 120/7; "Consultation du 15 Septembre, 1782" (Robespierre 1910, 1:112-114) ; "Consultation" (Buissart 1782, 68-71 The most, therefore, that could be said of the King's and Queen's devotion to the cause of the lightning rod was that although a similar instrument could plainly be seen from aspot on the grounds of La Muette where the Queen frequently lunched, neither she nor the King had ever complained of it.120 In fact, despite Vissery's, Buissart's and Robespierre's insistence that only a provincial backwater could hesitate to install a lightning rod, there were none in the capital before December of 1783, when Bertholon wrote to Buissart that he had just erected the first two.121
The publication of the memoir inaugurated a new stage of the debate, one which took place in print. The aldermen began to seek published corroborations of their arguments against lightning rods;122 and Buissart became concerned to refute these, and find his own corroborators. When, for example, he discovered that Grandidier's history of the Strasbourg cathedral (Grandidier 1776-78) contained a "bad idea of conductors" and that Marat, in his treatise on electricity (Marat 1782), "also speaks disadvantageously of lightning rods,"he urged his collaborators to respond through the journals.123 Bertholon declined with emphasis: Grandidier was "an ignorant"l24 and Marat "a lunatic."125 Another author, a potential supporter, was "a man with no judgement, who does not know how to write, and who is singularly ridiculous, and very old."l26None merited a response or reference. So Buissart himseif, under an assumed name, wrote the refutations, which he later deemed to have "worked marvelou~ly."~27 He sent two letters to the Affiches de Flandres, signed "Nostradamus." In the first, Nostradamus explained the differ- Buissart 122 For example, the St. Omer aldermen publicized their discovery of two articles in the Journalde Luxemburg making a case against lightning rods. Buissart responded by sending a letter to the Affiches de Flondres, and wrote to Cotte that it was important "to combat [these two articles] but this task cannot be mine, since 1 am the lawyer for M. de Vissery, it must be that of M. Le Roy or yours." Buissart to Cotte, I I December 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ I18j68.ence between a "lightning rod" and an "electrometer," to show that a lightning rod can never be positively charged, and so can never positively "e1ectrize"the house it protects. The second letter presented a distinction without a difference: lightning rods did not attract electricity, but on the contrary, electricity sought out lightning rods.
Moreover, Nostradamus claimed, by its proclivities, electricity compensated for all manner of structural problems in a lightning rod. Let the bar be too thin, "the thunder will follow it even while melting it."Let it be broken, "the thunder, due to its affection for metallic materials, will jump to carry itself from one Bar to the other." Let the gap be wide, "the thunder will furrow the wall a bit to arrive"at its beloved bar. Finally, Nostradamus explained that a lightning rod acted only within its "sphere of activity," a funnel-shaped area of electrical "void"extending from the point into the clouds above. The faultiest lightning rods, ungrounded or with rusted points, had no sphere of activity, so no effect, making lightning rods innocuous at worst.128 These were the facts, unsullied by explanations, and fully certified by experts.
Buissart's memoir made a strong impression. At home in St. Omer, Vissery told Buissart, he had discussed it with the Lieutenant General,1z9 who before reading it had shared "the general opinion that the blade of the Sword was Electrised and magnetized to attract the Thunder." The officer was sufficiently converted by Buissart's text to ask Vissery if he could come see the apparatus, "to which I gladly consented."l30 Meanwhile in Paris, Bertholon reported having talked of the trial with Jean d'Alembert, at whose house "all the best assemble each evening."l31 There were, however, some lingering areas of dissatisfaction. Vissery, recall, now disliked the idea of an inspection by members of the Paris Academy, as recommended in the Parisian barristers' consultation. As for Buissart's brief, which Vissery had read upon its return from Paris, he found it "a little voluminous," with "too great a display of Erudition." Vissery was certainly thinking of the costs of printing a 90-page document. But his argument was stylistic. Vissery invoked Morveau's "Of the Style of the French Bar," which celebrated the simplicity of 128 Buissart, "Lettre de Nostradamus au Redacteur des affiches de flandres," n.d., AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/27. 129 The Crown named "Lieutenant Generals"to the provinces to keep the provincial governers in check. In practice, however, the authority over the provincial government rested more with the Commandant than with either the Governor or the Lieutenant General. See supra, n.
35, and Marion 1923, 336. 130 Vissery to Buissart, n.d., AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/!20/4. 131 Bertholon to Buissart, 15 December 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 1191 15bis. Bertholon promoted the brief tirelessly: "I have spoken to many people about your excellent memoir in favor of M. de Vysseri, it is much enjoyed and much applauded, and does you great honor. I will continue to procure for it as many sales as possible. The Lawyer and the Lightning Rod 85 legal writing.132 Most readers, Vissery insisted, would understand nothing "of abstract matters ... one must therefore limit oneself to the facts." After a testy response from Buissart, Vissery apologetically retracted his editorial suggestions.133 But Buissart himself had gestured, in his brief, toward forgoing "reasons"in favor of "facts."134 This gesture, together with Vissery's admiration for a "fact"-based legal style, and his new disenchantment with the idea of an examination by experts, prepared the ground for Robespierre's change of strategy.
Act V: The Trial
Maximilien Robespierre, while still a schoolboy, had demonstrated such a "pronounced taste for the exact sciences" that all Arras had taken to calling him by the nickname "Barometer" (Jacob 1934, 278) . He was familiar not only with the principles and demonstrations of contemporary natural science but with its central epistemological dogma: knowledge of nature resides in sensation and experience, not theory. Early acquaintance with this dogma prepared Robespierre to develop upon, and eventually to depart from, his senior colleague's strategy for beguiling the judges of the Conseil dilrtois.
In the fall of 1782, having finished his brief, Buissart handed the lesser work of oral argument to his junior colleague.'35 The case came before the Conseil d'Artois the following May (Robespierre 1910 , 1:23, n. 2; Paris 1870, 56).'36 Robespierre presented his plea, which lasted an hour and a quarter, on May 1 7 . 1 3 7 He did not argue the importance of consulting experts in scientific cases. He did not emphasize the difference between physics and jurisprudence. Instead, he began with aflattering reassurance: "Do not fear, Sirs, that I will engage in an infinite discussion of a theory alien to the Bar (if there are any completely alien to it)." He promised to speak a common language: "I will dwell above all on facts and experience" (Robespierre 1783a, 36-40) .
Although the historical and scientific material and the many examples in Robespierre's plea were drawn from Buissart's brief, Robespierre departed sharply from Buissart in his legal strategy. He abandoned Buissart's claim that the aldermen 132 Morveau, "Du style du barreau franqais" (Morveau 1775, 3:137-99) . 133 Vissery to Buissart, 10 June 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 451 120/ 7; Vissery, "Observations sur le Memoire," AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/32; Buissart to Cotte, 15 July 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 118/64; Vissery to Buissart, 25 October 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/8.
134 See s t p a , note 4. 135 Robespierre's appointment is mentioned in Vissery to Buissart, 25 October 1782, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/8; see also Walter 1961, 1:35-37. 136 Valour, the St. Omer bailiff, had died in the interim, so Vissery made his claims for recovering the costs of the appeal against Valour's widow, and against the Renard-Debussy's. In claiming that the bailiff's heirs should be liable for the costs of Vissery's appeal, Buissart argued that the bailiff had made himself liable by withholding the names of Vissery's accusers. See Buissart, draft of memoir, AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/30, 75.
in AGPC, Coll. Bar., 4J/ 120/23. had violated Title 21 of the Ordinance of 1667 by failing to call for an expert consultation. Nor did Robespierre claim, as Buissart had done, that experts must decide the appeal, and that the Arras judges should defer to academicians. He instead made the opposite argument. The assessment of Vissery's lightning rod, he said, was fully within the competence of the judges of the Conseil d'Artois.138
The "Public," knowing that the lightning rod "was due to Physics," and each realizing his own ignorance in that science, might imagine "that this affair was placed outside the sphere of the Bar, and that without being a Physicien by profession, it was impossible to decide whether electric conductors were harmful or advantageous."However, Robespierre assured thejudges that "far from requiring a specialized study of Physics," the knowledge of lightning rods rested entirely upon "daily experiences ... our most familiar amusements; [and] phenomena that offer themselves to our eyes in each storm" (Robespierre 1783a 62-63; Robespierre 1783b, 88-89) . In short, the lightning rod was a matter of fact. Savants might be required to settle questions of theory, but not questions of fact. The virtues of the lightning rod were fully proven by "experience."It sufficed "to have common sense and eyes to recognize them; and Magistrates can pronounce boldly on this point."L39 A magistrate's duty to the people -which the St. Omer aldermen had failed to discharge -was to consult, not the experts, but the facts.
In arguing against a consultation with experts, Robespierre drew not only upon the empiricist principles of contemporary natural and legal philosophy, but also, implicitly, upon Rousseauian political theory. In his 1750 "Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences," Rousseau had railed against the sterile abstractions of academic science, "the ratios in which attraction acts in vacuo; and ... what curves have conjugate points." Out of "idleness,"experts generated such "futile"knowledge, and brought about a general dissolution of morals and corruption of taste. This was the fault, not of science, but of expertise: "The greatest orator in the world was Consul of Rome, and perhaps the greatest of philosophers Lord Chancellor of England." If the "former had only been a professor at some University, and the latter apensioner at some Academy, [would] their works ... not have suffered from their situation?"The sciences needed, not leisured specialists, 138 The "infinite relations of the ... sciences with the power and prosperity of States" macle distinguishing "a dangerous citizen" from a "useful suvunt" central to the process of governing (Robespierre 1783a, 36-38) . There were also practical reasons for this change of tactics. In addition to responding to Vissery's growing impatience, Robespierre himself was probably eager to win the case quickly and definitively, rather than merely winning it provisionally, subject to an expert examination (see Robespierre 1783b, 97) . 139 Robespierre drew a further distinction between new, controversial techniques of science and older, established ones. If Vissery's lightning rod "were the first instrument of this sort ... if on one side they praised the utility of this kind of machine, while on the other they represented it as a pernicious invention, and if these two opposed systems rested on principles of Physics," then the judge would have no choice but to turn to the academician. But the lightning rod was as established in physics as inoculation in medicine, which "enjoys, since a considerable time, the confidence of the public,"and no longer required an official sanction by the Society of Medicine (Robespierre 1783b, 85-87). but politically engaged practitioners, who could combine knowledge with power, legitimating both.140
In the same way that no discrete group of experts ought to practice the arts and sciences, Rousseau argued that no such body could legitimately govern. The Social Contract (1762) accordingly rests upon the rejection of a form of political expertise, that is, representation. Once again, the experts' corporate particularity was their ruin. No class of deputies could represent the true sovereign. This sovereign, the general will, was a "collective being" formed of the individual wills of all the citizens. No subset of the citizenry could stand for this collective being, because "the particular will tends, by its very nature, to partiality."l41
No expert could speak for the facts; no deputy could speak for the people. Rousseau repudiated both sorts of extrapolation from particular experience to general knowledge. These repudiations resonated with the empiricist teachings of contemporary natural science. The Social Contract was a "crashing failure," Rousseau's "least popular book before the Revolution." But, as Robert Darnton has persuasively argued, Rousseauian political theory was pulled from obscurity and transmuted into a popular force by amateur natural science, the "greatest fashion of the decade before 1787." Scientific amateurs developed a "vulgar kind of Rousseauism"in which the contractual origins of society shrank to the vanishing point, while the rejection of experts and their sterile "rationalism" loomed large. Rousseau's reference to a pre-contractual state of nature fueled a "mystical" notion in popular science of sensationist intimacy with the "primitive" natural world. A romantic empiricism thus informed the genesis of popular Rousseauism.142 Robespierre's brief for Vissery was a milestone in this development.
For here, Robespierre accomplished a potent connection between natural and social philosophy. He founded Rousseauian repudiations of both expertise and false political power upon the empiricist principles of contemporary natural science and legal theory.143 The further development of this empiricist rendering of I4O Rousseau,"A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences"( 1750) (Rousseau 1973, 16, 28) . The references in the quote are to Cicero and Francis Bacon.
141 A particular will might accidentally coincide with the general will, but its inability to represent the general will was definitional, the general will being defined by its generality. Rousseau, The Social Contract (l762), 200-201. Rousseau developed his rejection of political representation in response to the crucial role that the authors of traditional liberal political theory (notably Montesquieu) assigned to administrative elites. In liberal theory, it was the constitutional role of traditional elites to discern and defend the interests of the people, See Baker, "The Calculus of Consent" (Baker 1975,225-44) . 142 Darnton studies these developments in one particular fad of popular natural science, mesmerism (Darnton 1968, 3, 161, 124, 115-16) . 143 Robespierre's empiricist version of Rousseau's political philosophy is one moment in a long history of interactions between epistemology and political philosophy. In this history, epistemologies and styles of political philosophy have aligned differently at different times. For example, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have studied an earlier moment, during the English Civil Wars of the mid-seventeenth century, and a very different alignment. In their reading of Robert Boyle's and Rousseau would be central to Robespierre's later career. In his Revolutionary speeches, he would maintain that Rousseau's "doctrine"was "drawn from nature." The sentiments of civic responsiblity were, Robespierre insisted before the National Assembly, "more natural than you think."*44 He would thus attach the general will to purported facts of the individual psyche, producing an empiricist, anthropological political the0ry.1~5
Legislators must accordingly renounce the eternal disputes of the "metaphysicians."They must operate inductively, always "composing [their] general principles from particular observations." Particularity was itself a guarantee of generality. Robespierre's favorite of Rousseau's writings had been dedicated to this point. The author of the Confessions had announced himself unique and universal, each in virtue of the other. "Myself alone. I feel my heart and I know men."Nature had broken the mold in which it cast him and, by revealing that mold's most singular idiosyncrasies, Rousseau would "show my fellows a man in all the truth of nature; and this man will be myself" (Rousseau [1770 (Rousseau [ ] 1995 . Echoing both Rousseau and Montesquieu, Robespierre demanded, "Is it not the case that the more general a thing is, the more it is subject to exceptions?"l46
Empiricist governing, like empiricist natural philosophy, meant the pragmatic acceptance of contradiction, mystery, and the weakness of reason, since the "moral world, even more than the physical world, seems full of ... enigmas,"l47 No abstract theory of representation must intervene between the enigmatic passions of the individual and the actions of the state. Instead, representatives must identify absolutely with the represented.148 The state must accept as givens the beliefs of the individual, and inductively generalize these beliefs into national institutions. In particular, Robespierre would claim that the popularity of religious belief was an incontrovertible fact. The "aristocratic" idea of atheism was an artificial product of "philosophism," while the "entirely popular" idea of an "incomprehensible power" arose naturally. In obeisance to this fact of human nature, the state must institute a civic cult for the promotion of virtue and unity, Moreover, Robespierre would argue, his own empiricist respect for the fact of popular belief in a supreme Thomas Hobbes'dispute about the social value of philosophical empiricism, Boyle joined empiricist principles to a liberal theory of government, and Hobbes, rationalist principles to an absolutist theory of government (see Shapin and Schaffer 1985) . 144 Robespierre, "Sur les rapports des idtes religieuses et morales avec les principes rtpublicains et sur les fetes nationales. Rapport prtsente au nom du Comitt de Salut public"( 18 flortal an I1/7 May 1794) (Robespierre 1989, 321) ; "Sur la rttligibilitt des dtputts de I'Assemblte nationale (18 May 179 I) (Robespierre 1989, I 17) .
145 Barny writes that Robespierre "adheres to the anthropology of Rousseau," and that "the expression 'the nature of things' ... that returns incessantly to Robespierre's lips testifies to his desire to treat the objects of society in the most objective and scientific manner possible, following the lesson of Montesquieu," Barny, "Robespierre et les Lumitres" (Jessenne et al. 1993,48, 50) . 146 Robespierre, "Sur la fuite du Roi"(l4 July 1791) (Robespierre 1910, 7571-72) . 147 Robespierre, "Sur les rapportsdesidtes religieuses"(7 May 1794) (Robespierre 1989,317,306) . 148 Here, Robespierre was developing upon Rousseau's criticism of political representation. Robespierre, "Sur la rttlection des membres de I'Assemblte nationale" (16 May 1791) (Robespierre 1989, 115) .
being allowed him to "speak neither as an individual, nor as a systematic philosopher, but as a representative of the people."'49
Robespierre's notion of an empiricist basis for political authority was first developed in his plea for Vissery. There he rehearsed its several corollaries: the condemnation of rational theory, expertise, and false political power; the embrace of enigma as a rebuke against rationalism; and the insistence that particular experiences are related to general truths, not by theoretical explanation, but by inductive generalization. Added together, these summed to the claim that a sound argument must rest upon inductive generalizations from enigmatic particulars, and that the maker of such an argument could lay claim to a dual authority: he spoke for nature and for the people.
Ingeniously, in his plea for Vissery, Robespierre professed to let the facts speak for themselves, while at the same time hardly touching upon most of what one would assume were the relevant facts.
He said nothing about the design of Vissery's lightning rod. As we have seen, details about any particular lightning rod or stroke did not speak for themselves. Quite the contrary, they spoke with the greatest promiscuity and ambiguity for several opposing theories of the lightning rod at once. Instead of offering particular details as facts, Robespierre adopted a more persuasive strategy. He presented the judges with a series of inductive generalizations about electrical behavior. According to Robespierre's implicit, negative definition, these generalizations were "facts" because they were nottheories.
They derived their status as not-theories from the absence of any interpretive system mediating between them and the particular observations in which they were founded. These generalizations were facts, in other words, thanks to their stubborn refusal to participate in theoretical explanations.150 Quite the opposite of explaining, Robespierre's facts marked explanatory limits. One did not explain a fact; it was itself the last word in the matter; beyond it was out of bounds. A fact was the unexplained explainer, the absolute sovereign. Facts, defined as particulars generalized and as the unsurpassable ends of explanation, were checks on power and reason, on the particular will of the expert, the system-builder, the usurper of the people's sovereignty.
Thus, according to Robespierre, "experience has shown that the electric material tends toward metals and aqueous fluids" and "observation convinced us that metallic points have the virtue of drawing off electric material." Certain materials were "suited by their nature to receive" electricity, while others were not. The electrical material would "necessarily seek"a metal bar; electricity had a "predilec- tion" for metal; it was thus "physically impossible" for electrical matter to jump from a metal bar to a wooden house. These were facts. Electrical action was "no longer a mystery" but was now "an elementary principle" (Robespierre 1783a, 36-40, 52) -the difference being the renunciation, not the achievement, of understanding.
Foacier de RuzC, the Arras prosecutor (avocat gintral du Roi), who inherited the case in its appeal, spoke the next week, on May 24.15' Robespierre had embraced empiricism in principle, but made only principled arguments in its name. RuzC said nothing about empiricism, but his arguments were purely practical: each one concerned the design of Vissery's lightning rod. Ruz6 supposed the bar to be a half-inch in diameter, the width "recommended by thephysiciens,"and suggested that in some cases its capacity might be too limited to accommodate the electrical matter. Might not the thunder then "divide itself, and direct one of its divisions into the house'?~52 In fact, Le Roy had raised a similar problem in an offhand remark in a letter to Buissart: "I forgot to tell you that all is well with the conductor of M. de Vissery, except the channel of tin,. . . [which] being very thin, can easily be pierced, that is what happened with a tin pipe in the lightning stroke at Brest."l53
RuzC showed, furthermore, that he too could deploy empirical evidence. "Experiences and observations have taught,"he wrote, that "the necessary precautions in this regard are not yet perfectly fulfilled." He too cited the Viennese example, the sparks the rod had been seen to throw, a clear indication of its insufficient capacity. Ruze concluded, not with hostility toward the sciences, but on the contrary, with an implicit assumption of their continued progress. Lightning rods, he said, must be regarded as dangerous "untilphysiciens have found the means of guaranteeing them with absolute certainty." Finally, RuzC, like Buissart, argued that "Magistrates are not at all Savants; their mission is not to decide questions that concern the sciences." Like Vissery's own barrister and Parisian consultants, the prosecutor recommended that the court consult a scientific academy before pronouncing on the design of Vissery's lightning rod. 154 Buissart, now in the guise of a "former professor of physics," reported the first stages of the trial to the Feuilles de Flandres. He either did not notice, or did not object to Robespierre's change of strategy. Indeed, Buissart said nothing of Robespierre's plea except that it was "a masterpiece of erudition and eloquence.'' On the other hand, though he called RuzC's defense "weak," he faithfully reproduced its "anti-conductorist" arguments:
lightning rods attract thunder to the armed building, the crampons that attach the machine to the wall, the unknown thickness of the Rod, the accidental disintegration, the luminous spray that shines at the point in stormy weather, the sphere of activity, the armed Buildings on which thunder has fallen, the points of conductors that have melted, &c., &c. presented successive dangers; the crampons and the disintegrating Rod, lateral explosions; the thickness of the rod and the melted points, an uncertainty; the luminous spray at the point, an engorgement; the sphere of activity, a void in the clouds; houses armed and incinerated, aproof of attraction, &c. ... it was even advanced, that the lightning rod, performing its function, condensed the electric material in the bosom of the earth, which could produce volcanoes, earthquakes, waterspouts, Brc.155
Robespierre was granted a response on 31 May (Robespierre 1910, 1:22-23) . He began by characterizing the prosecutor's arguments as "reasonings of theory."His message was simple: forget reasoning and theory. "[Elxperience is on my side,"
and "against experience .., what good are all the reasons?" Robespierre proposed neither to support theory with facts, nor to derive theory from facts, but to set facts against theory. The "natural tendency" of electrical matter toward metal bars in preference to tile roofs was a fact. It represented all the explanation that physics required, and superseded any question about its mechanism. A "Poet or Orator" might call it a miracle. A philosopher would recognize it as no prodigy, but a "law of nature," and an "ordinary phenomenon'' (Robespierre 1783b, 68-69, 79) .
Taking on RuzC's arguments in succession, but never refuting them, Robespierre instead dismissed each one as theoretical, and therefore invalid. His opponent reckoned that there was a comparatively low probability of being struck by lightning, making the potential risks of a lightning rod less worthwhile. Robespierre dismissed the calculation and asserted a fact: "I have not verified this calculus of probabilities: what I know with certainty, is that the victims of thunder are unhappily too numerous." Ruzt wondered how to know the dimensions of a lightning rod's sphere of influence. Robespierre replied casually that "all the facts" showed it was "very considerable."But, he demanded, "what does it matter to us to measure it with a geometrical exactitude?" (Robespierre 1783b, 70-72) . Calculations and geometry were theory, and theory was irrelevant.
To every "theoretical" query, Robespierre had a "factual" answer, that is, an undefended assertion. What if the rod attracted lightning that would not otherwise have struck? Robespierre responded in the casuistic style of "Nostradamus": to say the rod "attracts" electricity was only a figure of speech. In fact, the rod was "purely passive,"and it was the lightning that sought the rod. What if the rod were too small to accomodate all the electricity, and released some onto the roof! Robespierre responded that "such an engorging. . . could not take place,"since the lightning would only seek the rod for as long as it offered easy passage. When the rod became full, the lightning would look elsewhere (Robespierre 1783b, 72-74) . RuzC also posed Nollet's question, how to conceive that such a vast quantity of volatile material could enter such a small point? Robespierre chastised, "How to conceive this phenomenon? . , . it matters little how to conceive it, if experience attests that it exists. If it were inexplicable, it would have that in common with most other effects that nature presents to us." Lightning would escape from a conductor when rivers climbed mountains, when iron fled the magnet, when dropped rocks forgot to fall. Theirs was not to reason why (Robespierre 1783b, After Robespierre's response to R u z & , ]~~ the court rendered its judgment: Vissery was permitted to reestablish his lightning rod, but he must desist in all claims against his accusers, and must bear the costs of the reestablishment and the appeal hirn~elf.15~ Vissery wrote to Buissart, "you have given me .., victory."But he added, "I would have wished ... it to be more complete."l58 74-75, 77).
Epilogue
Vissery's triumph was promptly written up in the Mercure de France. The notice praises Robespierre as "a young lawyer of rare merit," and advertises Buissart's brief as "an estimable Memoir that can be regarded as a treatise of physics."l59 In the wake of their shared triumph, Vissery, Buissart and Robespierre formed a mutually beneficial alliance. "The three of us share the glory," Vissery wrote to Buissart after the judgment, "you, Monsieur, for your well-Written Memoir, Monsieur the Orator for his Eloquent Plea, and I by the winning of a cause that is no longer controversial." 160 Robespierre seized the moment, applying to Vissery for funds to publish his pleas (Waiter 1961, 1:37-39) . The plea was to be printed in Arras, announced in was signed. The appeal was in the name of one Bobo, a merchant in the rue MarchC-aux-herbes who sold salad from a double-bag he wore over his shoulders. Buissart suspected Bobo of being a convenient new front for the old opposition as, being entirely without funds, he was immune to Vissery's counter-claims against him.166 BObO'S appeal reinvigorated interest in the Vissery affair. Briefly, there was talk of its being heard in the Parlement of Paris.167 An editorialist in Des Essarts' Causes cklkbres wrote sarcasticafly that Bobo showed a surprising discernment of the merit of the academy of sciences: you even assess the levels of learned companies; you fix the degree of confidence that each should obtain; you make a subtle distinction between lightning rods of the city and lightning rods of the countryside; you want thephysiciens to explain themselves with precision on each of these objects. So much erudition seems to me suspect in a salad merchant.
The illustrious Franklin and the immortal Buffon, the editorialist predicted, would surely race each other to St. Omer, eager to take on such an important function. "How I love to imagine them crossing the market," he scoffed. The Conseil d'Artois ultimately vacated Bobo's appeal (Des Essarts 1784, 171-72, 188) .
Death, when it came to Vissery the summer after his legal triumph, did not suffice to make him relinquish his philosophiczl mission, and he left instructions in his will that the future inhabitants of his house must preserve the lightning rod; furthermore they must pay an annual rent of 12 livres for its maintenance. An alderman bought the house, cheaply in view of the unusual charge, and promptly called in experts to inspect the contraption. These experts concluded unanimously that Vissery's rod was "erected contrary to the rules of the art and could not remain in its present state."So the aldermen got theirs: they tore down the lightning rod of M. de Vissery de Bois-Vale, in the name of public safety and modern science.168
Nevertheless, the notion that Robespierre triumphantly defended in the summer of 1783, that scientific facts could ground political decisions without intervening theory or explanation -without expertise -remained powerful in France throughout the tumult of the following decade. Lightning would continue to illuminate, at least in political rhetoric, the foolishness of the people and the experts alike. L'homme du peuple and l'homme du monde were equally bamboozled by lightning, explained a pamphlet published in 1789, entitled Thunder Considered in its Moral Effects on Men. While the people retreated into superstition, the experts adopted "ingenious systems, but mistaken." The author of the treatise revealed his secret for transcending systems and superstitions to arrive at the truth about thunder: being neither peasant nor physicien, he was a "good observer" (Lanteires 1789, 5-9, 14) . In the summer of 1793, ten years after Robespierre's plea for Vissery, the Jacobin-led National Convention, with Robespierre at its helm, abolished experts from French officialdom by the following decree: "All academies and literary societies established or endowed by the nation are eliminated."169 Some months later, Robespierre told the Convention: "Eh! what do they matter to you, legislators, the diverse hypotheses by which certainphilosophes explain the phenomena of nature?"'70 Ten years earlier, a compelling story about the relations between physics and jurisprudence had won a small victory for a young, provincial lawyer and an old, provincial tinkerer. That story now attained its institutional culmination as the official policy of the French Republic. From the particular, the universal was born.
